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iDEFENSE Security Advisory 2008-07-30.1

iDEFENSE Security Advisory 2008-07-30.1
Posted Jul 31, 2008
Authored by iDefense Labs | Site idefense.com

iDefense Security Advisory 07.30.08 - Local exploitation of an untrusted path vulnerability in the "dbmsrv" program, as distributed with SAP AG's MaxDB, allow attackers to elevate privileges to that of the "sdb" user. When a local user runs the "dbmcli" program, the MaxDB executes a "dbmsrv" process on the user's behalf. The "dbmsrv" process, which is responsible for executing user commands, runs as the user "sdb" with group "sdba". This vulnerability exists due to improper sanitization of the "PATH" environment variable. By prefixing the "PATH" environment variable with a path under the attacker control, one is able to execute arbitrary code iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in SAP MaxDB version 7.6.03.15 on Linux. Other versions may also be vulnerable. with "sdb:sdba" privileges.

tags | advisory, arbitrary, local
systems | linux
advisories | CVE-2008-1810
MD5 | d187db4d824398f4405de6519303b02f

iDEFENSE Security Advisory 2008-07-30.1

Change Mirror Download
iDefense Security Advisory 07.30.08
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Jul 30, 2008

I. BACKGROUND

SAP's MaxDB is a database software product. MaxDB was released as open
source from version 7.5 up to version 7.6.00. Later versions are no
longer open source but are available for download from the SAP SDN
website (sdn.sap.com) as a community edition with free community
support for public use beyond the scope of SAP applications. The
"dbmsrv" program is set-uid "sdb", set-gid "sdba", and installed by
default. For more information, visit the product's website at the
following URL.

https://www.sdn.sap.com/irj/sdn/maxdb

II. DESCRIPTION

Local exploitation of an untrusted path vulnerability in the "dbmsrv"
program, as distributed with SAP AG's MaxDB, allow attackers to elevate
privileges to that of the "sdb" user.

When a local user runs the "dbmcli" program, the MaxDB executes a
"dbmsrv" process on the user's behalf. The "dbmsrv" process, which is
responsible for executing user commands, runs as the user "sdb" with
group "sdba".

This vulnerability exists due to improper sanitization of the "PATH"
environment variable. By prefixing the "PATH" environment variable with
a path under the attacker control, one is able to execute arbitrary code
with "sdb:sdba" privileges.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with
privileges of the database owner, usually "sdb". To exploit this
vulnerability, an attacker must have the ability to create executables
on the system.

IV. DETECTION

iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in SAP MaxDB
version 7.6.03.15 on Linux. Other versions may also be vulnerable.

V. WORKAROUND

iDefense is currently unaware of any workaround for this issue.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

SAP AG has addressed this vulnerability by releasing a new version of
MaxDB. For more information, consult SAP note 1178438.

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2008-1810 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

03/27/2008 Initial vendor notification
04/01/2008 Initial vendor response
07/30/2008 Coordinated public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php

Free tools, research and upcoming events
http://labs.idefense.com/

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2008 iDefense, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please e-mail customerservice@idefense.com for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct,
indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or
reliance on, this information.

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